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Privatization Incentives – A Wage Bargaining Approach* 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the incentives of a government to privatize a state owned firm. Assuming 
price cap regulation, a unionized labor market and wage bargaining the government’s 
gains from privatization depend on two effects. While the government looses control 
over the firm’s investment and employment decisions, the union’s bargaining position 
can be weakened by privatization. Since price cap regulation tends to increase the wage 
under privatization, the government’s incentives to privatize are low if the union’s bar-
gaining power is high. Considering different kinds of in-vestments does not change this 
result qualitatively.  
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  1  Introduction 
During the past decade economic policy in many countries focused on privatization of large, tra-
ditionally state owned firms. While empirical evidence suggests that privatization induces greater 
economic efficiency, this observation alone can hardly explain why governments rely on privati-
zation as a policy instrument
2. With perfect information and perfect factor markets, a government 
giving up control over a firm’s investment, employment and pricing decisions looses influence on 
potentially relevant economic measures. Any efficiency gains from privatization must hurt the 
government inasmuch it could have imitated the decisions of a private management. As William-
son (1985) asked, why would it not be possible for the state to mimic a capitalist firm and to in-
tervene in a discretionary way only in cases when the government thinks this is necessary. 
A part of the answer is certainly fiscally induced – the SOEs often neither yield a profit, nor 
do they meet the goal to increase social welfare in an adequate way. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the government cannot offer an incentive compatible contract to the managers – it has a 
commitment problem.
3 Schmidt (1996) showed that even for a benevolent government privatiza-
tion is advantageous as it enables it to credibly commit to a hard budget constraint, which re-
moves the bailout disincentive.
4  
Beside such incomplete contracts approaches, there is another strand of literature that deals 
explicitly with the different incentives in public and private firms. Corneo (2001) for example 
analyzes two types of working incentives, which are differently treated in public and private 
firms. He differentiates between individual tasks, which are mainly promoted in private firms, 
and cooperative tasks, primarily promoted by a public firm.
5 It is theoretically unclear, whether 
privatization entails productivity improvements (due to tougher work incentives) or deteriora-
tions. The privatized firm may set incentives that divert too much effort away from the coopera-
tive tasks. In such a case, the workforce in the private firm displays a lack of collegiality. 
                                            
2 For an extensive survey on empirical studies see Megginson/Netter (2001). 
3 The possibility of discretionary intervention allows the government to extend the infrastructure beyond a 
profit-maximizing optimum and this might invalidate any incentive contract based on profit sharing. 
4 See also Boerner (2004). Shirley and Xu (1998) find that the representative contracts used in state 
owned monopolies provide only weak incentives and thus lead to high inefficiencies. 
5 The outcome of individual tasks can be assessed, albeit imperfectly. In a cooperative task it is almost 
impossible for the management to assess the contribution that one particular worker makes to the solu-
tion of the collective task. A particular feature of the latter is that workers derive some utility from social 
interaction with their colleagues when accomplishing a collective task. 
1 Another strand of literature dealing with reasons for privatization comprehends political 
economy models as the one by Boycko et al. (1996), which suggest that privatization is an effec-
tive instrument to alleviate corruption and to foster restructuring. However, the question why a 
government can not implement the corresponding incentive mechanisms for state owned firms 
and why it actually may want to privatize is not explicitly addressed. Bias and Perotti (2002) ana-
lyze politically motivated privatization in a bipartisan environment. They argue that privatization 
combined with a broad distribution of shares may induce the median voter to shift her political 
preferences towards a right-wing government.
6
  
In our paper we take a different approach and depart from the assumption of perfect factor 
markets by assuming that the labor force is unionized and that wages are determined by Nash-
bargaining between either the government or a privatized firm and the union. Furthermore, allow-
ing for a simple price cap regulation shows that the government can in fact benefit from privati-
zation. Since privatization can lower the negotiated wage markup and since the government’s 
privatization revenues are positively correlated with the firm’s profits, the government can be 
better off with privatization.  
This approach is in a way similar to the one of Schmidt (1996), as it is concerned with the 
commitment problems a government may face in enforcing efficient investment and labor em-
ployment. Regardless this mutuality the commitment problem which we analyze is, in contrast to 
Schmidt who sets the focus on the incomplete contract problem, due to an imperfect labor market 
where wages have to be negotiated between the government and a union. Analyzing these rela-
tions more carefully it turns out that the union’s bargaining power has a non monotone impact on 
the government’s gains from privatization. Privatization tends to be especially worthwhile if the 
union’s bargaining power is moderate rather than high. This is due to the fact that price cap regu-
lation implies that a privatized firm can not reduce its output and that its labor demand is rather 
inelastic. Thus, with a high bargaining power of the union the difference between the negotiated 
wages with and without privatization tends to be small and privatization becomes a less attractive 
instrument for the government. Considering different investment opportunities to alter the firm’s 
short run technology does not change this result qualitatively. Whether long run investments in-
crease the firm’s productivity or the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, the gov-
                                            
6 Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) provide some empirical evidence for these results. In Denmark, however, the 
largest privatization have been done by the center-left government of Poul N. Rasmussen (1993-2001), 
see Paldam and Chistoffersen (2004). 
2 ernment’s gains from privatization are highest if the union’s bargaining power is moderate rather 
than high. 
In the next section we set up the model. In section 3 we first analyze the wage bargaining 
with and without privatization. We then characterize the investment decisions under both re-
gimes. Section 4 presents a numerical example which illustrates the different effects determining 
the government’s incentives to privatize. A short conclusion is provided in section 5. 
 
2  The Model 
Our analysis is based on the following model with one firm producing just one good x. There are 
three production factors: labor l and two kinds of capital k and I. While l and k are variable fac-
tors, I represents investment determining the firm’s short-run production technology. We will 
distinguish the cases in which I increases factor productivity and in which it mainly affects the 
elasticity of substitution between l and k. The production possibility set is strictly convex contain-
ing all (x; l; k; I) satisfying  
0 ) , , , ( ≤ I l k x F , with:  .    (1)  I k l x F F F F > > > > 0
Consumer surplus CS, the firm’s profits Π and the union’s utility U are given by 




0        ( 2 )  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) I k r l w x x p r w I k l x + − Δ + − = Δ Π , , , , , ,     (3) 
l l U Δ = Δ ) , (          ( 4 )  
 
where p(x) with p’(x) < 0 and p’’(x)x+2p’(x) < 0 denotes the inverse demand function, w and r 
are the (given) market prices for labor and capital and Δ denotes the wage markup to be deter-
mined in the wage bargain between either the government or the privatized firm and the union. 
The government’s aim is to maximize the weighted sum of CS, Π and of a convex combination 
of U and the employment level l:
7
 
    [ ] U l CS W ) 1 ( ) 1 ( γ γ ν μ − + + Π + + =     (5) 
   with:  μ < 0 ,   1 0 < <ν ,   1 0 ≤ ≤γ       (6) 
                                            
7 For ease of exposition we omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead to any confusion. 
3 With  μ < 0 we implicitly assume that the government has to rely on distortionary taxation in or-
der to finance other not explicitly modelled expenditures. Assuming  1 0 < <ν  and  1 0 ≤ ≤γ  al-
lows us to capture some basic aspects from the political economy literature.
8  0 > ν º and  1 = γ  
imply that the government is also interested in a high employment level which may increase its 
re-election probability. The union’s influence acting as an interest group can be modelled by as-
suming 1 < γ . 
Assuming that the firm is initially state owned, we analyze the following four stage game. In 
the first stage the government can decide whether or not to privatize the firm. If the firm remains 
state owned the government can control all subsequent decisions of the firm and gets the firm’s 
profits. With privatization the government’s (privatization) revenues are again determined by the 
firm’s profits. However, we will assume that the government imposes a simple price cap regula-
tion such that the privatized firm has to offer a quantity 
 
) ( :
1 p p x x
− = ≥         ( 7 )  
where  p  denotes the price cap. Instead of analyzing the optimal price cap we focus on the sim-
pler case in which x is such that the consumers can not be worse off under privatization. That is, 
we assume that x is equal to the quantity offered if the firm remained state owned. While this 
assumption reduces the government’s incentives to privatize the firm, it does not alter the strate-
gic effects which price cap regulation has on the investment decisions and the wage bargaining 
under privatization. Investment I is chosen in the second stage. Wage bargaining between either 
the government or the privatized firm and the union takes place in the third stage. In both cases 
we focus on the Nash-solution, i.e., we assume that the wage markup is determined by 
 
Δ
s = arg max   if the firm is state owned      (8) 
α α − 1 U W
  or 
   Δ
p = arg max   if the firm is state owned      (9) 
α α − Π
1 U
 
where  α − 1  with  1 0 ≤ ≤α  measures the union’s bargaining power. In the final stage output x 
and the quantities of the inputs l and k are chosen. Without privatization x can be chosen accord-
                                            
8 See for example the probabilistic voting models discussed in Persson/Tabellini (2000). 
4 ing to the government’s objective function (5). With privatization the firm can only choose l and 
k – given that (7) is binding. 
Solving the game by backward induction we analyze the government’s incentives to privat-
ize the firm by comparing the government’s payoffs (5) with and without privatization. 
 
3  Wages and Investments 
We first analyze the last two stages of the game and determine the optimal solutions for x; l and k 
for both the state owned and the privatized firm. Analyzing the wage bargaining reveals that price 
cap regulation tends to increase the markup under privatization. This result is more pronounced 
the higher the bargaining power of the union which also implies that the government’s incentives 
to privatize the firm should be low if the union’s bargaining power is high. 
With respect to the investment decisions it turns out that both the state owned as well as the 
privatized firm will distort their investment according to its impact on the negotiated wage. The 
direction of these distortions is likely to be the same with and without privatization. Underin-
vestment tends to be optimal if investment is productivity enhancing. Overinvestment will occur 
if investment increases the elasticity of substitution between l and k. 
3.1 Supply, Factor Demand and Wage Bargaining 
We start by characterizing the solutions for the case in which the firm is state owned and in 
which it is privatized. Comparing the solutions allows us to discuss the government’s incentives 
to privatize the firm. 
State Owned Firm Using (1) and (5) the Lagrangian for government’s optimization 
problem is given by 
 
[ ] F U l CS L
S λ γ γ ν μ + − + + Π + + = ) 1 ( ) 1 (      (10) 
 
Evaluating the first order conditions with respect to k; l and x shows that the solutions  ( ) I x l
s , ,Δ , 
 and   satisfy  () I x k
s , ,Δ ( I x
s , Δ ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , , , = Δ I k l I x F
s s s and
9
 
                                            
9 Subscripts denote partial derivatives. We focus on interior solutions which are guaranteed as long as 
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Equation (11) reveals that the government distorts its input decisions according to the weights it 
puts on labor and the union’s utility. Equation (12) simply reflects the inverse elasticity rule 
based on the distorted input decisions and on  φ − Δ + w  as the wage rate relevant for the gov-
ernment. 
Turning to the third stage and using l
s; k
s and x
s let  ( ) I W
s ,
~
Δ and  ( ) I U
s ,
~
Δ  denote the reduced 
objective functions of the government and the union, respectively. Using (8), employing the en-
velope theorem and evaluating the first order condition with respect to Δ implies that the negoti-
ated wage markup   satisfies  ( α , I
s Δ ) ( ) 0 1 , = Δ I
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   (13) 
for  1 0 < ≤α . With  1 = α  the union has no bargaining power which leads to the government’s 
preferred markup equal to 0. With  1 0 < <α  the negotiated markup simply equates the weighted 
marginal loss of the government and the weighted marginal utility of the union. Note that the 
union’s marginal utility depends inter alia on how the government’s optimal supply x
s reacts to an 
increase of Δ
s. Using (11) and (12), simple comparative statics reveals  . Further-
more,   decreases c.p. with the elasticity of the demand, 
0 / < Δ ∂ ∂
s s x
s s x Δ ∂ ∂ / ( )( p x p p x / ) ′ . Therefore, the 
markup tends to be lower the more elastic the demand function. 
Privatized Firm Assuming that the price cap regulation is binding and maximizing (3) with 
respect to l and k, the firm’s input decisions  ( ) I x l
p , ,Δ  and  ( ) I x k
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6 As usual, (14) indicates that price cap regulation does not distort the firm’s input decisions. Em-
ploying l
p and k
p, let   and   denote the firm’s reduced profit function and the 
union’s reduced utility function. Using (9), the envelope theorem implies that the wage markup 
 which is negotiated between the privatized firm and the union satisfies   and 
) , ( ~ I
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for  1 0 < ≤α . 
Comparison Assuming that the investment I is given, holding Δ constant und using
s x x = , 
(11) and (14) show that—from the government’s perspective – the privatized firm employs too 
little labor. Thus, the government will privatize the firm only if privatization induces higher prof-
its and thus lower wage markups (recall that  ). With  0 ) 1 , ( ) 1 , ( = Δ = Δ I I
p s 0 > α , (13) and (15) 
indicate that the difference   depends on two main effects. First, the RHS of 
(13) is lower than the RHS of (15) as long as 
) , ( ) , ( α α I I
p s Δ − Δ
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        ( 1 6 )  
 
That is, the more the government weighs the union’s utility, i.e., the lower γ, and the higher 
the consumer surplus, the more the markup tends to decrease with privatization. On the other 
hand, price cap regulation generally leads to an increase of  . Since the privatized firm is 
not allowed to reduce its output,   is c.p. less elastic than  . Furthermore, with (13) 
and (15) this effect is more important the higher the bargaining power of the union, i.e., the lower 
α. Focusing on the polar case of 
) , ( α I
p Δ
) , ( ⋅ Δ
p l ) , ( ⋅ Δ
s l
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With θ increasing from 0 to 1 the comparative statics of l
c, k
c and Δ




s (·, 0) and l
p, k
p and Δ
p (·, 0) (see (11), (14) and (13), (15)). Differentiating (18) 
with respect to θ and taking into account that Δ
c (θ) maximizes the union’s utility we get 
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Using   and  0 < Θ [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 /( > Δ − + − =
s γ γ μ ν φ  (see (11)), (19) shows that privatization leads to 
an increase in the markup if  and  Θ ν  are low enough: The lower Θ the more elastic is the gov-
ernment’s labor demand compared to the labor demand of the privatized firm; the lower ν  the 
less the government weights employment and/or the union’s utility. Both effects imply that the 
government’s option to reduce output and thus employment induces a lower markup if the firm 
remains state owned. 
Summarizing the analysis, privatization and price cap regulation leads to an efficient factor 
allocation which c.p. hurts the government. The effects on the (negotiated) wage markup are less 
clear cut. On the one hand privatization tends to reduce the markup since privatization decreases 
the relative weight which the union’s marginal utility has in the wage bargaining. On the other 
hand, the imposed price cap regulation strengthens the union’s bargaining position. This effect is 
more important the higher the union’s bargaining power and the more the government is willing 
to decrease output and thus employment if the markup increases. 
3.2 Investments 
Turning to the second stage of the game we again start by characterizing the investment decision 
if the firm remains state owned. We then analyze the investment of a privatized firm. Investment 
is distorted in both cases as the government as well as the privatized firm anticipate the effects of 
their investments on the negotiated wage markups. 




s and using the envelope 
theorem, the optimal investment I
s(α) of a state owned firm is implicitly determined by 
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where (21) follows from the optimality condition for k
s. Therefore, we get 
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which immediately implies that investment is inefficiently low (high) if   (0 ) holds. 
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Ignoring the second order effects, i.e., the first term on the RHS of (23), the sign of   is deter-










Δ + 2 , and using (13) shows that this term is negative if the bargaining power of the union 





depends on the effects which I has on the firm’s technology. With I mainly affecting the marginal 






















 tend to be 
rather small. Combining these observations implies that the government has an incentive to over-
invest, i.e., to choose I such that 0 > FI > Fk, if the union’s bargaining power is relatively high 
and if investments mainly increase its possibility to substitute labor by variable capital. Underin-
9 vestment is more likely to be optimal if the union’s bargaining power is low and if investment is 
productivity enhancing such that the optimal labor employment would decrease. 
Privatized Firm With privatization, the same calculations as above reveal that the 
firm’s optimal investment I
p(α) is given by 
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Comparing (24) and (22) shows that the privatized firm has basically the same strategic incen-
tives to distort investment as the government. Similarly, considering the sign of 
p
I Δ  I comparative 
statics with respect to I leads to (assuming 0 < α < 1 and focusing on I = I
p) 
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Again, the higher the union’s bargaining power and the more investment allows to substitute la-
bor by capital the more the privatized firm will tend to over invest. Underinvestment is likely to 
be optimal, if investment is productivity enhancing. 
These results show that the strategic incentives to distort investment are the same with and 
without privatization. Therefore, government’s gains from privatization will mainly be deter-
mined by its bargaining power and by its objective function, i.e., by its weights on profits, em-
ployment and on the union’s utility. Whether investment is productivity enhancing or primarily 
affecting the substitutability of l and k should not alter the government’s incentives for privatiza-
tion. 
 
4  A Numerical Example 
In order to illustrate the above results and to analyze the government’s privatization decision 
more carefully, we now analyze a simple example. The inverse demand function is given by 
 
  ( ) p x 2 x with: 0 x 2 = −≤ ≤  (26) 
 
With respect to the firm’s production technology we consider the following two cases: 
 
10   i) 
1 2 0,5 0.5 2 xI l k ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦  (27) 
  ii)  ()()
2 0.5 0.5 I
x 1 l 1 k  with:  :
1I
⎡⎤ =− κ + − κ κ = ⎣⎦ +
. (28) 
 
In case i) I increases the productivity of l and k but does not affect the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between l and k. In case ii) investment decreases the elasticity of substitution 
. In both cases we focus on the effects of a varying  () () ( )
0.5
lk 1/ 1 l / k η= −− κ − κ [ ] 0,1 α∈  while 
holding the other parameters constant, i.e., we assume rw 0 . 1 = =μ=ν=  and .  0.5 γ=
Solving the example shows that the government will privatize only if α is relatively large 
(but strictly smaller than 1). These results hold for both cases i) and ii) which confirms that the 
union’s bargaining power has a non-monotone impact on the government’s gains from privatiza-
tion and that different kinds of investments do not change this observation qualitatively. 
To see this more clearly, consider first case i). Figure 1 shows the graphs for the optimal in-
vestments  , the implied wage markups  ()
i* I w i t h  i s , α= p ( )
i* Δ α  and the government’s utility 





Figure 1: Case i): Investments and Markups with    0 γ=Analyzing  
s* I;
p* I and   and 
s* Δ
p* Δ  note first that investment is productivity enhancing which 
implies that the optimal investments of the state owned and the privatized firm increase c.p. with 
the corresponding wage markups. However, since  1 α =  leads to  ( )(
s* s* 1 Δ= Δ ) 1  and since the 
government puts more weight on labor we get  ( ) ( )
s* p* I1 I1 < . Considering   we obtain 
. Thus, while both the state owned and the privatized 
firm underinvest, lowering α (starting with 
1 α<
() j () i ()
s p ii *
I 0 for I I  and W Δ> = α α> Π α
1 α = ) implies that the optimal investment and the 
induced markup increase faster if the firm remains state owned. With relative low values of α the 
effect of   on   vanishes whereas the government’s option to reduce output 






s* p* II <  and 
s* p* Δ <Δ . Employing these 
results and calculating the government’s utility with and without privatization shows that the 




Figure 1: Case ii): Investments and Government’s utility with   0 γ=
                                            
8 Obviously, with α = 1 the government will never privatize the firm. 
12 In case ii) we get the same qualitative results with respect to the government’s gains from 
privatization. Using (28) shows that investment serves as an instrument to reduce the markup by 
increasing the elasticity of substitution between l and k. While both the state owned and the pri-
vatized firm overinvest, Figure 2 shows that with high values of ® the higher markup without 
privatization also induces higher investment if the firm remains state owned.
11
For low values of α the same arguments as in case i) imply that the markup and thus invest-
ment is higher if the firm is privatized. Evaluating the government’s utility reveals that privatiza-
tion is worthwhile only for low values of α, i.e, for  [ ] 0.73 , 0.99 α∈ , which confirms that the 
government’s incentives for privatization are qualitatively the same as in case i) in which produc-
tivity enhancing investment was considered. 
 
5  Conclusions 
Analyzing a government’s gains from privatization we focused on the potential impact of an im-
perfect labor market. In a model with a unionized labor force and wage bargaining we showed 
that privatization combined with price cap regulation can in fact be a worthwhile policy measure 
for the government. Privatization alters the union’s bargaining position and can lead to lower 
wages. Anticipating this effect the government’s revenues from privatization are higher than the 
firm’s profits if the firm remains state owned. However, since this positive effect is not mono-
tonically correlated with the union’s bargaining power, the government’s incentives to privatize 
the firm turns out to be especially high if the union’s bargaining power is rather low (but posi-
tive). The analyzed example shows that a government can indeed suffer from privatization if its 
own bargaining power is low.  
These results do not depend on the investment opportunities of the firm. They are rather due 
to the assumption that a privatized firm is constrained by price cap regulation. While price cap 
regulation implies an efficient factor allocation, it also reduces the elasticity of the (privatized) 
firm’s labor demand which tends to increase the wage markup under privatization. Thus, regulat-
ing the firm’s prices in order to ensure high output entails the negative drawback of improving 
the union’s bargaining position. Alternative regulatory schemes such as rate of return regulation 
may alter this trade off and price cap regulation may not be the optimal regulation if unionized 
                                            
11 With Δ = 0 the efficient investment is 0. 
13 labor markets are considered. The government’s incentives for privatization, however, would 
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